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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 11-1981 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARKEITH JOHN WEBB 
a/k/a John Markeith Webb, 
                             Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 5-09-cr-00755-001) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 June 5, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, Jr., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed September 27, 2012) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
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 Following a jury trial, Appellant Markeith Webb was found guilty of armed 
robbery and of using and carrying a firearm during that armed robbery.  He was 
sentenced to 199-months imprisonment, five years of supervised release and ordered to 
pay restitution.  Webb appeals, raising various issues.  We will affirm his conviction and 
sentence. 
I. 
During the robbery of the Lafayette Ambassador Bank, the Appellant was 
recognized by bank tellers as the grandson of an elderly bank customer.  Webb had 
displayed a firearm during the robbery and had stolen nearly five thousand dollars.  When 
removing the cash, Webb had taken two dye packs from two separate money drawers.  
As Webb fled the bank, a teller observed one of the dye packs explode and spray red 
colored dye in the area.   
 The day after the robbery, a local merchant contacted the authorities to report that 
he had currency that was discolored with red dye.  After determining that the cash was 
used after the robbery, law enforcement got video surveillance footage showing Webb 
entering an Exxon Square convenience store and speaking with a clerk.  That clerk 
identified Webb as someone she knew as “Pip,” and that he had entered the store asking 
to exchange fifty dollars bills into smaller denominations.  The clerk noticed red dye on 
the currency Webb was trying to exchange.  Video footage also showed the car Webb 
was driving---a green Chevrolet Malibu registered to Webb‟s girlfriend.  An address for 
Webb‟s girlfriend, Shaina Marie Holmes was obtained and the car was found at her 
residence.  Police noticed red dye stains on the car‟s interior. 
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 Webb was arrested while in possession of additional red-stained currency. 
 At a later meeting with authorities, Webb admitted to the Lafayette Ambassador 
bank robbery and to driving his girlfriend‟s green Chevrolet Malibu.  He denied, 
however, ever threatening anyone during the course of the robbery.  Lastly, he admitted 
to disposing of most of the damaged currency, reserving approximately $2500.00 for his 
personal use.  At trial, the Government did not introduce any of Webb‟s statements as 
evidence against him. 
II. 
 On appeal, Webb raises several issues challenging his conviction and his sentence. 
A. Franks Hearing Error 
Webb first argues that he was entitled to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978).
1
  The District Court denied Webb‟s motion for a Franks hearing.  
Normally, we review the denial of a motion for suppression for clear error as to the 
underlying facts and exercise plenary review as to its legality.  Inasmuch as the most 
demanding standard articulated by any court is de novo, and because the de novo standard 
of review is satisfied here, we need not determine the applicable standard today.  When 
reviewing the District Court‟s refusal to hold a Franks hearing de novo, it is clear the 
court did not err because Webb failed to establish the requisite preliminary showing.   
                                              
1
 A Franks hearing is a hearing to determine whether a police officer‟s affidavit used to 
obtain a search warrant was based on false statements by the police officer.  Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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Webb argues that the warrant for his arrest was based on a flawed affidavit.  He 
contends that the affidavit omitted certain facts, that these omissions were intentional or 
made with reckless disregard for the truth, and, as a result, there could be no probable 
cause to arrest him.  We have conducted a de novo review of the record and conclude that 
Webb did not meet his burden of establishing he was entitled to a Franks hearing.  First, 
we note that affidavits supporting warrants are presumptively valid.  Webb offered no 
evidence in support of his request for a Franks hearing, and the District Court 
accordingly determined that he had failed to make a substantial showing that the 
affidavits reflected false statements that were made knowingly and recklessly.  We agree 
with the District Court.  Webb‟s argument focuses on an alleged falsity in two paragraphs 
of Detective Alonzo‟s affidavit.  This allegation, even if true, is not enough to support an 
inference that Detective Alonzo acted recklessly or was deliberately untruthful.  Even if 
the events at the bank did not occur as allegedly reported in the affidavit, that sheds little 
light on the affiant‟s veracity.  Franks and its progeny make clear that a defendant must 
make a substantial showing that the affiant knew of or recklessly disregarded the 
informant‟s untruthfulness.  The District Court committed no error in finding that Webb 
was not entitled to a Franks hearing.   
B. Denial of Motion for New Trial 
 Next, Webb argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a new 
trial because it was based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence.  He points to the 
destruction of an envelope on which one teller had written notes, and bank forms that 
were provided to tellers after the robbery.  The destruction of these pieces of evidence, 
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Webb maintains, entitled him to a new trial because the Government failed to turn them 
over to him during discovery.   
Although framed in his brief as a violation of  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), Webb‟s actual basis for a new trial is the destruction of exculpatory evidence.  
We examine this claim under a different standard.  As has been noted, “[t]he Supreme 
Court‟s jurisprudence divides cases involving nondisclosure of evidence into two distinct 
universes.  Brady and its progeny address exculpatory evidence that is still in the 
government‟s possession.  Youngblood and Trombetta govern cases in which the 
government no longer possesses the disputed evidence.”  United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 
990, 993 (1
st
 Cir. 1993).  Although destruction of evidence may constitute a due process 
violation, “[a] defendant who claims destroyed evidence might have proved exculpatory . 
. . has to show the prosecution‟s bad faith in ordering or permitting its destruction.”  
United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1993).  Absent proof of bad faith, 
“failure to preserve evidence that might be of use to a criminal defendant . . . is not a 
denial of due process.”  Id.  To prove bad faith, there must be a “showing that the 
Government intentionally [tried] to gain some tactical advantage over [the defendant].”   
Webb has not proven that the Government acted in bad faith.  Detective Alonzo 
testified that the descriptions of the robber on the envelope matched the description given 
him by the same teller later in his investigation.  There was no need to keep the repetitive 
notes on the envelope and discarding it does not rise to the level of an intentional act 
necessary to gain a tactical advantage over Webb.  Therefore, the District Court did not 
err by denying Webb‟s motion.  
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C.  Improper Use of Proffer Agreement 
 “[A]ny statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty” is not admissible against the 
defendant who “was a participant in the plea discussions.”  FED. R. EVID. 410; see also 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (providing that the admissibility of any plea, plea discussion, or 
any related statement is governed by Rule 410).  However, a defendant may waive his 
rights under Rule 410 and Rule 11, and allow the government to introduce statements 
made in the course of plea discussions, “as long as there is no „affirmative indication that 
the agreement [to waive] was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.‟”  United States 
v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 569-70 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995)).  Here, Webb‟s proffer agreement 
provided that the government could use at trial statements that Webb made during the 
proffer, in the event that Webb were to make representations at trial inconsistent with 
those he had made at the proffer.  Webb does not challenge the voluntariness of his 
proffer agreement.  Instead, he raises a more generalized argument that his proffer 
agreement was invalid because of a lack of consideration.   
 The proffer letter states that the Government “will consider” Webb‟s proffer “in 
formulating an appropriate resolution to this matter.”  Webb might prefer that the proffer 
letter he signed include some clearer statement of the Government‟s contractual 
obligation.  Although the written statement of the bargain set forth by the Government is 
minimal, it sufficiently sets forth the benefit the Government confers–an appropriate 
resolution of the matter.  Put another way, the proffer letter, as written, obligated the 
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Government to hear and evaluate Webb‟s statements as an initial step toward a possible 
compromise.   We are, therefore, satisfied that the proffer agreement sets forth 
consideration and is not invalid on that ground. 
D. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 
 
Lastly, Webb argues that his sentence was procedurally invalid because the 
District Court improperly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement based on 
obstruction of justice.  We conclude that Webb‟s challenge to the obstruction of justice 
enhancement under section 3C1.1 is meritless.  Application note 1in the commentary to 
this Guideline section states that “[o]bstructive conduct that occurred prior to the start of 
the investigation of the instant offense of conviction may be covered by this [G]uideline 
if the conduct was purposefully calculated, and likely to thwart, the investigation or 
prosecution of the offense of conviction.”  U.S.S.G.§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.1.  Briefly, the 
Government proffered recorded telephone conversations between Webb and his brother.  
During these conversations, Webb sought to have his brother confront the teller who had 
identified Webb as the robber.  The District Court reasonably concluded that Webb‟s 
request that his brother confront a critical witness constituted an attempt to “threaten[ ], 
intimidat[e], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[e] ... [a] witness.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 app. 
n.4(A).  The District Court did not err by applying these enhancements. 
III. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the conviction and judgment of sentence of 
the District Court. 
